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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
SEPARATE TRIALS FOR DEFENDANTS JOINTLY INDICTED.
It is provided by statute1 in New York today that defendants,
jointly indicted, may be tried separately or jointly in the discretion
of the trial court. This is substantially an enactment of the rule
which prevailed at common law,2 which, however, was altered by
legislation passed in 1829, wherein it was provided that where two
or more persons were jointly indicted for any felony, any defendant
requesting it would be entitled to a separate trial.3 This remained
the law in this state 4 until the amendment to the Code of Criminal
Procedure enacted by the laws of 1926.'
When shall the trial judge exercise his discretion and grant sep-
arate trials 7 How shall the peremptory challenges of the joint de-
fendants be apportioned, if at all? 6 One may well visualize the
importance of the determination of these questions to an individual
whose life is at stake, about to be tried jointly with a defendant who
has already confessed and who is indifferent to his fate, has a dam-
aging record, or who is treacherously scheming to avoid conviction
by shifting the guilt, with the help of perjured testimony, upon his
co-defendant. Denial of the application by the trial judge of separate
trials will not be reviewed unless there has been an abuse in the ex-
ercise of his discretion.7
Although the restoration of the common law rule by the legis-
lature has been heralded as a salutary step forward in the speeding
up of criminal procedure in our courts, s we must still bear in mind
that the accused has a fundamental right to a fair and impartial
trial.9 Let us inspect briefly a few of the recent cases involving
I Code Crim. Proc., Sec. 391, as amended by L. 1926, Ch. 461, in effect
July 1, 1926.
' People v. Vermilyea, 7 Cow. 108 (1827); Rex. v. Noble, 15 Howell's
State trials 731; U. S. v. Marchant and Colson, 25 U. S. 480 (1857).
'2 R. S. (1st Ed. 1829), Pt. IV, Ch. 2.
Re-enacted in the Code Crim. Proc., L. 1881, Ch. 504, Sec. 391.
Supra Note 1.
Sec. 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows: "When
several defendants are tried together they cannot sever their challenges, but
must join therein." See also Sections 372 and 373 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
'People v. Stochon, 1 Parker's Crim. Rep. 424 (1853); Webster V.
People, 92 N. Y. 422 (1883); Matter of Whitman, 225 N. Y. 21, 121 N. E.
485 (1918).
'See Hiscock, Criminal Law and Procedure in New York (1926), 26
Col. L. Rev. 253, 257. See also 26 Col. L. Rev. 752.
'The words of Lehman, J., in his dissenting opinion in People v. Fisher,
249 N. Y. 419, 428, 164 N. E. 336, 339 (1928) are significant:
"No consideration of expense to the state, inconvenience to witnesses
and public authorities, or even of delay in punishment of the guilty canjustify a procedure which results in serious impairment of the rights of
an accused to a fair consideration by an impartial jury of the competent
testimony produced against him."
NOTES AND COMMENT
Section 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and view the trend of
judicial opinion.
In People v. Doran,'0 two persons were jointly indicted and
tried for murder in the first degree. Each of the defendants con-
tended that he should be tried separately, the main contention of each
being that the other had made a confession." Denial of separate
trials was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It seems hard to be-
lieve that the jury, even though cautioned, could deliberate with com-
plete fairness on the individual guilt of each of the accused without
some mental confusion arising from their consideration of both con-
fessions. One confession ' 2 may have been illegally secured by force
and violence,' 3 yet because the confession of the co-defendant ap-
peared to be dependable and accurate, it is easily conceivable that
the former was disregarded and both defendants convicted on the
latter confession.
The Court of Appeals was also called upon to decide in the
Doran case the apportionment of the peremptory challenges avail-
able. 14 The trial court had held that all the defendants must join
in the peremptory challenges, and their view was sustained in the
highest court. 15 The legislature having established the method of
apportionment of peremptory challenges, the court was powerless to
vary the rule.16 The apparent injustice in requiring that each de-
fendant join in all peremptory challenges is a matter for legislative
reform.' 7
In the notorious case of People v. Snyder and Gray, 18 the ques-
tion of separate trials was again before the Court of Appeals. Both
defendants had made confessions. Mrs. Snyder made an applica-
tion for a separate trial. The defendant Gray joined with the
10246 N. Y. 409, 159 N. E. 379 (1927).
See Bishop's New Criminal Procedure, Secs. 1018, 1019 and cases there
cited.
The voluntariness of Dorai's confession was extremely doubtful in the
case under discussion. See dissenting opinion, per Lehman, J., 246 N. Y. at
429, 159 N. E. at 387.
For confessions generally, see the Code Crim. Proc., Sec. 395; People v.
Weiner, 248 N. Y. 118, 161 N. E. 441 (1928).
'
4 Suprd Note 6.
1By the common law, established in Salisbury's case, 1 Plowd 100,
and never departed from, if two or more persons were put on trial jointly for
crime, they were each entitled to the full number of peremptory challenges
allowed by law. though the Crown could compel them to elect whether they
would join in their challenges or be tried separately. See Ann. Cases, 1914,
A at p. 860 and cases there cited.
1I People v. Cosmo, 205 N. Y. 91, 98 N. E. 408 (1912); People v. Dunn,
157 N. Y. 528, 52 N. E. 572 (1898); Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 7 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 350 (1887) ; U. S. v. Marchant, supra Note 2.
"S U. S. v. Marchant and Rex v. Noble, supra Note 2. In England,
due to the fact that each defendant jointly indicted was entitled to the full
quota of peremptory challenges, many separate trials were granted due to the
scarcity of talesmen available.
Is246 N. Y. 491, 159 N. E. 408 (1927).
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state in opposing this application. In their confessions, and upon
the trial, where each defendant testified, each attempted personal
exculpation by throwing as much of the blame as possible upon the
other. The Court of Appeals upheld the conviction and affirmed the
denial of separate trials. In its opinion the Court took particular
pains to point out the scrupulous care of the trial judge in protecting
the individual rights of both defendants: 19
"No general rule limiting or governing the exercise of
the court's discretion can be deduced from these decisions.
* * * The courts should apply but one test. Will separate
trial impede or assist the proper administration of -justice
in a particular case and secure to the accused the right of a
fair trial ?" 20
Granted that elasticity of discretion is desirable frequently, is the
glittering generality of this test a fair safeguard for an accused?
Are fundamental rights to be sacrificed to secure greater speed,
economy and convenience in the administration of the law?
In People v. Fisher 2 ' three defendants were jointly indicted and
tried for a felony murder. Two of the defendants had made confes-
sions. The defendant Fisher steadfastly denied guilt and the other
two defendants who had implicated him in their previous confessions,
repudiated these confessions completely on the trial. Fisher's motion
for a separate trial was denied. The subsequent conviction of all
the defendants was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In a dissent-
ing opinion in which Kellogg, J. concurred, Judge Lehman contends
vigorously that the denial of a separate trial to the defendant Fisher
was error.
22
"' In the Doran case, supra Note 10 at 426, 159 N. E. at 385, the trial Judge
allowed each defendant 30 peremptory challenges.
See also People v. Marcus, 220 App. Div. 697, 699, 222 N. Y. Supp. 456
(Ist Dept. 1927), aff'd 246 N. Y. 637 (1927), wherein the careful instruc-
tions of the trial Judge were stressed. In this case the defendant moved
for a separate trial after he had been jointly indicted with three others for
criminally receiving stolen goods. The defendant contended there was imminent
danger of confusion in the minds of the jury as to his individual -guilt as a
result of the admissions and conduct of his co-defendants. The motion for a
separate trial was denied.
See also People v. Stein, 221 App. Div. 4, 222 N. Y. Supp. 460 (2nd Dept.
1927) ; People v. Talzer, 221 App. Div. 3, 222 N. Y. Supp. 462 (2nd Dept. 1927).
Supra Note 18 at 497, 159 N. E. at 410.
-
tSupra Note 9.
2-Supra Note 9 at 428, 144 N. E. at 339. The dissenting opinion effectively
summarized the question as follows:
"Upon a joint trial, the jury is called upon to decide the guilt of each
accused. The jury hears the evidence produced against all. Evidence
which is relevant as to the guilt of one accused may be irrelevant upon
the guilt of a co-defendant. One defendant may have made admissions
or confessions which are competent evidence against him. They are
inadmissible against the other defendants. The jury must sift the evi-
NOTES AND COMMENT
Where the co-defendants have acted in the furtherance of a con-
spiracy the acts and declarations of one conspirator done and uttered
in the execution of a common design are admissible against any other
party to the conspiracy and it is not necessary that the conspiracy
should be charged in the indictment 2 3 But if the acts and declara-
tions of one conspirator take place after the common design is ac-
complished or abandoned, they are inadmissible against the other
conspirators. They must be made in furtherance of the prosecution
of the common object, or constitute a part of the res gestae of some
act done for that purpose.24
The foregoing cases stress the legalistic formula required at the
trial-that the jury may not consider the confessions, admissions and
conduct of one defendant not in furtherance of a conspiracy, or made
after the accomplishment or failure of the common purpose, in de-
termining the guilt of a co-defendant 2 5 Common experience and
common sense point in a different direction. Jurors are not accus-
tomed to weigh evidence in that manner. In weighing the credibility
of the testimony of one defendant, they can not and do not ignore
knowledge derived from other evidence which lends credibility to
that testimony; even though the jury might perhaps separate the
issues raised by each defense and consider only the competent and
relevant evidence bearing on those defenses. The duty of the courts
is to preserve intact both in letter and spirit, our constitutional guar-
antees of a fair and impartial trial. If in accomplishing this duty,
the courts must grant separate trials to defendants jointly indicted,
they should do so unequivocally.26 The better and safer course would
dence produced before it, and, in arriving at its determination of the guilt
of each defendant, it may consider only the evidence which is competent
and relevant against that particular defendant. We may assume thatjurors will try to obey the instructions of the court and to give to each
defendant a fair trial. The question will always remain whether they
can do so in a particular case. That question is now before us in
this case."
'Logan v: United States, 144 U. S. 263, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617 (1891);
People v. Becker, 215 N. Y. 126, 109 N. E. 127 (1915) ; People v. Storrs, 207
N. Y. 147, 100 N. E. 730 (1912); People v. McKane, 143 N. Y. 555, 38 N. E.
950 (1894); People v. McQuade, 110 N. Y. 284, 18 N. E. 156 (1888); People
v. Davis, 56 N. Y. 95 (1874).
Cases cited supra Note 23.
'The following extract from People v. Goskell, 132 Misc. 318, 319 (1928)
is typical of how far this consideration influences the courts in denying
separate trials:
"It is the duty of the Court to properly instruct the jury with
reference to the testimony affecting each defendant, and to see that the
rights of each defendant are properly safeguarded. This the Court will
do to the utmost of his ability. With this in mind, I do not see how any
harm can come to either defendant by trying the defendants together."
(Italics ours.)
"Personally I am firmly of the conviction that public policy even more
insistently demands that the courts should maintain the law in its full vigor
and should accord to every accused the rights guaranteed to him by law, than
that the guilty shall be swiftly brought to account. Each time a court affirms
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be to grant separate trials in every case where a co-defendant might
be prejudiced by the confessions, admissions or declarations of a co-
defendant and not leave it to conjecture or chance that he may not
be prejudiced.
BERTRAM R. BERNSTEIN.
SURVIVAL OF ACCRUED RIGHTS UPON THE CANCELLATION OF
EmPLOYMENT CONTRACTS.
It has been the rule in this state since an early date that where a
contract is terminated by the mutual consent of the parties, no claim
with respect to the rights already accrued thereunder can be enforced
unless expressly or impliedly reserved in the agreement which termi-
nates the contract.1 Yet not until recently did the Court of Appeals
apply this rule to a case of a simple contract of hiring and service,
upon the termination of which no further relationship was con-
templated by the parties.
In the case of Coletti v. Knox Hat Co., Inc.,2 decided in January
of this year, the Court of Appeals reversed an order granting a mo-
tion for summary judgment which had been affirmed by the Appellate
Division. The complaint alleged that on or about January 1, 1925,
the plaintiff and defendant had entered into an oral contract, the
terms of which were contained in a letter memorandum, which was
renewed in 1926 with slight modifications as to drawing account and
territory. The plaintiff was to be employed by the defendant in the
capacity of sales agent for a certain territory, with a drawing account
of $10,000 per year, payable bi-monthly, and traveling expenses for
the year, both to be deducted from total commissions. His commis-
sions were to be paid at the rate of 10% of the aggregate on the first
$150,000 sales for the calendar year, and 2% on all sales beyond that
amount. A check for the balance of the total commissions for the
year was to be given him as soon after January 1, as practical.
The complaint further alleges "That the plaintiff continued in
the employ of the defendant up to on or about September 1, 1926,
pursuant to and in accordance with said agreement * * * at which
a judgment where a right conferred by law has been disregarded it weakens
the force of the law. Indeed, the reasonable fear of the court where guilt is
clearly established it is impeding the course of justice may result in decisions
which make trial judges careless, and encourage public officers and prosecuting
attorneys in the view which often obtains the approval of the unthinking, that a
guilty man, even before his guilt is established according to law, has no con-
stitutional rights." From an address delivered by judge Lehman before the
Association of the Bar, February 27, 1930.
'McCreery v. Day, 119 N. Y. 1, 23 N. E. 198 (1890).
2252 N. Y. 468, 169 N. E. 648 (1930).
